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in Post-Authoritarian Indonesia 
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Abstract 
The downfall of the last authoritarian ruler in May 1998 marked the beginning of the transition to 
democracy in Indonesia. Before 1998, the autocratic government fi rmly monitored media content 
for decades. With the current broadcast liberalization, Indonesian televisions can produce almost 
any kind of program contents. However, a question arises, who actually controls television content 
in the era of liberalization? How do political and economic factors infl uence television workers 
in shaping content? This empirical research intends to focus on the infl uence politicians have on 
television program content in four elections in post-authoritarian Indonesia. The research question 
is: how do politicians infl uence television workers in shaping their content? The question needs 
a qualitative descriptive answer from various sources, including interviews with around 100 
television workers in the 10 largest TV stations, participant observations, documents, television 
reports, and other data sources. Research fi ndings reveal that the relationship between politicians 
and television intensifi ed ahead and during political campaigns. Most television stations had 
conducted a relatively fair and nonpartisan coverage of the 2004 and 2009 election, but unfair 
and partisan in the 1999 and 2014 elections. 
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Abstrak
Terjatuhnya rezim otoriter pada bulan Mei 1998 menandai dimulainya transisi menuju demokrasi di 
Indonesia. Sebelum tahun 1998, pemerintah otokratis memonitor konten media selama beberapa dekade. 
Dengan liberalisasi siaran saat ini, televisi di Indonesia dapat menghasilkan hampir semua jenis isi 
program. Namun, sebuah pertanyaan muncul, siapa yang sebenarnya mengendalikan konten televisi di 
era liberalisasi? Bagaimana faktor politik dan ekonomi mempengaruhi pekerja televisi dalam membentuk 
konten? Penelitian empiris ini bertujuan untuk memusatkan perhatian pada pengaruh politisi terhadap 
konten program televisi dalam empat pemilihan di Indonesia pasca rezim otoriter. Pertanyaan dari penelitian 
ini adalah bagaimana politisi mempengaruhi pekerja televisi dalam membentuk isinya? Pertanyaan tersebut 
membutuhkan jawaban deskriptif kualitatif dari berbagai sumber, termasuk wawancara dengan sekitar 100 
pekerja televisi di 10 stasiun TV terbesar, pihak yang terlibat, dokumen, laporan televisi, dan sumber data 
lainnya. Temuan penelitian mengungkapkan bahwa hubungan antara politisi dan televisi semakin intensif 
di depan dan selama kampanye politik. Sebagian besar stasiun televisi telah melakukan liputan yang relatif 
adil dan tidak memihak tentang pemilihan tahun 2004 dan 2009, namun pemberitaan Pemilu 1999 dan 
2014 cenderung tidak adil dan memihak.
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After 1998, once the authoritarian 
government was ousted and control over 
media, press permit and content checks 
were abolished, the media industry grew 
exponentially. Advertising holds as the very 
backbone of private TV station’s existence. The 
country’s liberalization and democratization 
process combined with a huge consumer 
market with increasing amounts of money to 
spend inspired large companies to increase 
their investments and promotions as they put 
the greater part of corporate advertising budget 
into television (Heryanto, 2002: 327) .
A year aft er Suharto resigned, the number 
of print media soared six folds to 1687 although 
half of these numbers disappeared later due to 
lack of business viability (Astraatmadja, 2001: 
43). In early 2000s, fi ve large new television 
channels were opened: Global TV, TV 7, Metro 
TV, Trans TV, and Lativi competing on a national 
basis with fi ve stations set up earlier during 
Suharto’s era. Some of these stations changed 
names later due to changes in ownership. 
Players in the Television Industry
Currently, Indonesia becomes the new 
emerging democratic country and media 
industry fl ourish aggressively. Until 2014, there 
had been fi ve key players in the Indonesian 
media industry consisting of five large 
diversifi ed business groups. All 10 national 
television stations are currently controlled by 
the fi ve business groups, which also control 
other types of media. They are: Media Group, 
Para Group, MNC Group, Bakrie Group, and 
Emtek Group.
Media Group. The group controls an all-
news TV channel, Metro TV, which has over 53 
transmission sites all over the country. Based 
in West Jakarta, Metro TV is the country’s 
first 24-hour news channel. The television 
channel began to broadcast in the capital in 
November, 2000. Besides its predominant 
programming in Indonesian, it is the only 
TV station to off er Mandarin news. It carried 
Introduction
The fall  of the last authoritarian 
government in Indonesia in 1998 allowed 
the rise of freedom followed by the process 
of transition to democracy in a country with 
the world’s fourth-largest population. Aft er 
the shift  of political power, various reforms in 
almost all aspects of life developed, particularly 
the media and press that relished freedom the 
most. 
For decades, the autocratic government 
fi rmly monitored the media, and those that 
dared to ignore or underestimate government 
control would face fatal consequences. Media 
permits were frequently revoked, subject to 
bans, and even closed down without gaining 
access to open trial. The downfall of President 
Suharto allows the media to appreciate the 
new circumstance of being free from the 
government’s strict control. 
Aft er the downfall of Suharto regime in 
1998, the political and media atmosphere in 
the country changed altogether from tyrant 
and tight state control to circumstances 
characterized by freedom and liberalization, 
a highly aggressive business sector, and 
essentially less state intervention (Heryanto & 
Adi, 2001: 75). 
The Renaissance of Indonesian media 
was initially stamped by the abolishment of 
the press permitt ing procedure (SIUPP) during 
the presidency of B.J. Habibie in 1999, followed 
by the abolishment of the information ministry 
blamed for its tough measures in closing down 
a number of media during the authoritarian era, 
and the passing of Press Law No 40/1999 and 
Broadcast Law No 32/2002 by former president 
Abdurrahman Wahid. The later advised that an 
independent body, the Indonesian Broadcasting 
Commission (KPI), be established. The KPI 
will function as a partner to the government 
for managing broadcast media. There was a 
dramatic increment in the quantity of media, not 
long aft er the nullifi cation of the press permitt ing 
framework (Gobel & Escborn, 2005 : 78).
206
Jurnal Ilmu Sosial dan Ilmu Politik, Volume 20, Issue 3, March 2017
programs in Mandarin to cater to its Chinese 
audience refl ecting the easing of restrictions on 
Chinese language and cultural media imposed 
during the authoritarian era. Metro broadcasts 
no sinetron (soap opera) programs, but the 
station airs entertainment talk show programs. 
Media group and its television station belong 
to the businessperson, Surya Paloh, who also 
owns a national newspaper Media Indonesia 
daily. Media Group also controls other local 
newspapers distributed in diff erent parts of 
Indonesia (Astraatmadja, 2001: 78)
Para Group.  The group controls Trans 
Media Corporation, which manages Trans TV, 
one of the quickest developing TV stations 
in Indonesia. The station began broadcasting 
on the 15th of December 2001, and it has been 
successful with its entertaining programs 
in capturing audience interest. Para Group 
originally focused on three business sectors — 
fi nance, property and multimedia. Para Group, 
controlled by businessman Chairul Tanjung, 
acquired Bank Mega in 1996 (The Jakarta Post, 
2011).
Tanjung started his business in 1987 
when he and his three companions built up 
PT Pariarti Shindutama, which manufactured 
kids’ footwear. Tanjung pulled back not long 
after from the company and built up Para 
Group, which developed into one of the 
fastest-growing business conglomerates, and 
Tanjung became one of Indonesia’s wealthiest 
men in the country. In December 2011, Tanjung 
changed the name of his business group to CT 
Corporation or CT Corp., initial of his name 
(Bland, 2013: 98).
The initial success prompted Trans Media 
to acquire the controlling stake of languishing 
TV 7 owned by an Indonesian giant publisher 
Kompas Gramedia Group in 2006. The latt er is 
controlled by Jakob Oetama whose reputable 
daily paper Kompas has been the market leader 
in Indonesia for decades. However, Kompas 
Gramedia failed to manage TV 7 successfully 
prompting the company to sell TV 7 to Trans 
Media which then changed the station’s name 
to Trans7.
Chairul Tanjung is close to former 
President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono. In 
2007, he coordinated several well-known 
entrepreneurs, and senior government offi  cials 
to launch the ‘Visi Indonesia 2030’ (Indonesian 
Vision 2030) project which mapped out how 
Indonesia could achieve a ‘developed status’ by 
the year 2030 (CTCorp, 2011). Tanjung chaired 
the project and since then he and his team have 
become unoffi  cial Presidential advisors.
Bakrie Group. Based in East Jakarta, 
TVOne is an Indonesian privately owned 
national television station. Aburizal Bakrie, 
who controlled private nationwide television 
station ANTV, expanded his venture in the 
television industry by buying shares in Lativi, 
another nationwide TV station grappled with 
fi nancial diffi  culties (Wibisono, 2012).
 Lativi  was established amid the 
national TV boom in early 2000’s. Lativi was 
initially owned by Abdul Latief, a famous 
businessman and former minister under 
Suharto. Latief established the station in 
1999, and it commenced broadcasting in 2002. 
The ownership of the network was changed 
to Aburizal Bakrie and Erick Thohir by the 
year 2007 due to debt and poor network 
management (Wibisono, 2012). The station is 
currently owned by PT Visi Media Asia, Tbk 
controlled by Bakrie Group.
TV One was launched on the 14th of 
February 2008. Aburizal Bakrie and his son 
Anindya Bakrie continue to dominate shares in 
Lativi (now TVOne) and ANTV. Anindya and 
Tohir were appointed as Chief Commissioner 
and Pesident Director respectively (Wibisono, 
2012). Aburizal was once a senior minister in 
President Yudhoyono’s cabinet for the period of 
2004-2009. In October 2009, Bakrie was elected 
chairperson of Golkar, the political party which 
held power throughout the New Order and 
which has survived as a key player in the post-
Suharto political landscape. 
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Meanwhile, there has been signifi cant 
change among the owners of television stations 
associated with Suharto’s family and cronies. 
The fall of former president Suharto in 1998 had 
dragged the business empires of his sons and 
daughters down as well. People like Suharto’s 
second son, Bambang Trihatmojo, and Sudono 
Salim (also known Liem Sioe Liong, a close 
Suharto crony) are no longer major owners at 
their respective televisions. 
MNC Group. The group manages media 
subsidiaries under Bhakti Investama Group, 
another holding company, which have widely 
varied business units mainly in the fi nancial 
service sector. This company group was 
established by Bambang Hary Tanoesoedibjo, 
better known as Hary Tanoe, who began 
gaining popularity in 2002 aft er he purchased 
24.5% shares in PT. Bimantara Citra Tbk from 
Bambang Trihatmojo, Suharto’s third child. In 
the same year, Bimantara Citra also took over 
a US$ 15 million debt of a television station, 
TPI, controlled by Suharto’s second child, 
Siti Hardiyanti Rukmana or Tutut. The debt 
takeover allowed Bimantara to control 75% 
of TPI through a subsidiary PT Berkat Karya 
Bersama (Suprapto, 2013). 
Since 2002, Hary Tanoe has held a major 
share of Bimantara Citra and been its CEO. 
Bimantara Citra holds 100 percent of PT Media 
Nusantara Citra (MNC), a holding company 
which manages media subsidiaries, including 
nationwide private television channels TPI 
(now MNC TV), RCTI and Global TV, and 
the principal permits of three national cable 
television networks.1  MNC also controls 
major print media and radio stations. In May 
2007, Bhakti Investama increased its stake in 
Bimantara to 52.85%, and at the same time 
the name of the company was changed to PT. 
Global Mediacom Tbk, and it became a sub 
holding of Bhakti Investama in the mass media 
1 The three networks are Indovision, Oke TV and Top 
TV.
industry including the broadcasting sector 
(Cahyafi tri, 2014)
Emtek Group. Since 2004, the two brothers, 
Fofo and Eddy Sariaatmadja, through their 
own holding company PT Elang Mahkota 
Teknologi (Emtek Group), purchased shares of 
PT Surya Citra Media (SCM), which controlled 
the nationwide private television station SCTV, 
from Henry Pribadi and Sudwikatmono 
(Suharto’s  cousin). However, Suharto’s second 
daughter, Titik Suharto (through her joint share 
with Sariaatmadjaja’s brothers) and Suharto’s 
grandson, Dandy Rukmana, remain members 
of the SCTV shareholder board (Ida, 2011 : 14). 
In 2001, Emtek Group also acquired 85% shares 
of PT Indosiar Karya Media Tbk, which controls 
a television station Indosiar, one of the major 
national television channels in Indonesia.
Apart from the five business groups 
already mentioned above, seven other media 
groups also control various media outlets. They 
are Kompas Gramedia Group, Jawa Pos Group, 
Mahaka Media, Beritasatu Media Holdings, 
MRA Media, Femina Group, and Tempo 
Inti Media. So, a total of 12 business groups 
currently control nearly all of Indonesia’s media 
outlets, including broadcasting, print media 
and online media. Although the Indonesian 
media industry has evolved since the late 1980s, 
but the 1998 reformasi (reform) became a turning 
point aft er which media businesses started to 
fl ourish noticeably (Nugroho, et.al 2012).
Media Content 
Censorship regulation, obviously, had 
existed during post-authoritarian Indonesia, 
but it is clear that the old practices of 
government intervention in the media is no 
longer prevalent. Although the broadcast 
watchdog, the Indonesian Broadcasting 
Commission (KPI) with its Public Broadcasting 
Guidelines and Program Standards (P3SPS), 
plays a role in controlling content in the era of 
liberalization, yet it is not the sole controller. 
When democratization removes government 
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intervention in media, and the media enjoy 
freedom of expression, we have to deal with 
the following questions: Who ultimately 
controls the content in the media? Who 
actually sh apes the news and entertainment 
content on television that we see and hear? For 
some, these are moot questions in media and 
communication studies. 
With the current liberalization, Indonesian 
media can produce almost any kind of contents, 
and such media freedom managed to increase 
people’s awareness regarding the economic and 
political situation of the country. Nonetheless, a 
question stands out whether the current media 
liberalizations could produce responsible and 
good media practice. The media possess the 
capability to add to the quality of democracy. 
Media freedom and independence are great in 
the event that they support other objectives, 
including cultural understanding, democracy 
advancement, prosperity, human development, 
and so on (Rozumilowicz, 2002: 13).
T h e  g e n e r a l  a s s u m p t i o n  i n  t h e 
development of rebuilding the media is that 
media should be away from dependency and 
control. Media reform should advance toward 
an ideal of independence and freedom. The 
structure of media is autonomous without 
interference from governments, owners, 
politicians, businesses, or dominant social 
groups (Linz and Stepan, 1996: 76).
In the media literature, issues on factors 
affecting media content are actually a part 
of the political economy of media. Political 
economy as a study started in the eighteenth 
century, somewhat to clarify, legitimize, and 
bolster the speeding up of capitalism (Mosco, 
1996: 11). According to Mosco (1996: 25), one 
likewise can consider political economy as 
the study of the social relations, especially the 
relations of power that commonly constitute 
the generation, circulation, and utilization of 
assets or resources. From this vantage point, the 
result of communication, such as media content 
and audiences, are the primary resources.
Some media theorists, including Golding 
and Murdock (2000 : 35), McQuail (2000: 97), 
Shoemaker and Reese (1991: 89) and Gerbner 
et.al (1969: 32) depicted communicators in mass 
media as working under pressure from internal 
and external variables such as: proprietors, 
customers or clients (for example, sponsors), 
other media (competitors), regulators, viewers, 
politicians, and others.
Politicians Infl uences
The emergence of mass media technologies 
has enabled us to simultaneously communicate 
with millions of people creating the possibilities 
for politicians to communicate with the masses. 
Not surprisingly, politics became enmeshed 
with the mass media, thus rendering politicians 
as key players in producing and circulating 
political symbolism. The relationship between 
media and politicians is based on a mutual 
need. The media need politicians to appear in 
the media so that they may att ract an audience 
by having access to authority fi gures. Politicians 
need to appear in the media to have a platform 
for their positions.
Unpacking the media’s role in the 
political process is facilitated by examining 
four themes – the nature of the relationship 
(institutionalized and informal) between 
journalists and politicians; how commercial 
pressures set parameters for journalists; the 
practices of political journalists; and journalistic 
belief about their role in the political process. 
The belief component of liberal journalism can 
best be understood by examining the notions 
of the Fourth Estate and watchdog journalism 
(Louw, 2005, p. 62)
The Fourth Estate and watchdog 
journalism are two interrelated notions 
central to the way in which the media/politics 
relationship has been conceptualized within 
liberal democracies. This idea grew from 
the notion that liberal journalists should be 
adversarial (towards politicians) to be eff ective 
watchdogs. Schultz (1998, p.29) notes that 
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liberal journalists now adhere to the following 
self-defi nition of their role:
To be necessarily critical of politicians 1) 
(adversarial);
To champion citizen rights against the abuse 2) 
of state power;
To provide a platform for debate.3) 
Sabato (1991) examined the full range of 
relationships that can develop between news 
production personnel and politicians. In this 
regard, he identifi es fi ve type of journalism. 
Although his notion referred to US journalism, 
nevertheless these are useful, not just for 
understanding American journalism, but 
also for understanding, in general, the sorts 
of relationships that can emerge between 
journalists and politicians anywhere.
Partisan Journalist. The first type of 
journalist-politician relationship is partisan 
journalism wherein the media support a 
particular political party, or ideology. This 
form of media characterized the early liberal 
oligarchies of Britain and America when middle-
class/burgher journalists actively worked to 
challenge monarchies. Partisan journalists 
worked collaboratively with those politicians 
they supported to help promote their causes. This 
type of journalists fl aunt their partisanship and 
propagandistic role with pride.
Nonpartisan Journalists. Nonpartisan 
journalists can adopt one of three insider 
relationships to the liberal political system 
(Louw, 2005, p.62):
The journalist-as-loyal-opposition, or 1) 
watchdog. This role can take two forms. 
Firstly, the provider of ‘intelligence’ (for 
policy makers). Secondly, the watchdog 
adversary.
The lapdog, where journalists cooperate 2) 
with politicians making the political system 
work. It is easy for partisan journalists to 
slide into becoming lapdog journalist when 
(successful) revolutionary movements they 
support become the government;
The journalist-as-emotional-provoker. 3) 
Journalists seek out those aspects of political 
behavior that provoke emotional responses 
(e.g. anger, shock or outrage) of the audience 
because these can be sensationalized and 
hyped up geared toward att racting mass 
audiences, rather than an actual concern 
with politics-as-policy. This type lends 
itself to politicians working with (or leaking 
stories to) journalists, in order to undermine 
their opponents.
The second type of journalist-politician 
relationship is Fourth Estate Journalism. In this 
model, journalists are insiders within the liberal 
political process. This is a part of the policy-
formulation process as far as they provide 
the policy-making elites with information, 
‘intelligence’ opinion and a platform for debate. 
This journalistic genre eschews sensation and 
titillation, and it can lead to confl ict between 
journalists and politicians since this type of 
journalists will also publish stories politicians 
dislike. However, the journalists do not cultivate 
a necessarily adversarial position. They are also 
not interested in pursuing political news in 
the form of political bickering as a means to 
att ract audiences. This genre is associated with 
‘quality journalism’ aimed at elite audiences 
interested in policy issues (Louw, 2005)
Third, there is muckraking (or ‘yellow’) 
journalism, which is commercially driven, 
strives to build mass audiences through 
sensationalism. The media attract mass 
audiences by presenting spectacular, titillating 
or lurid stories about the rich and famous, 
including politicians. Stories of confl ict, sex 
and pain are also rampant. Journalists justify 
such stories by deploying the Fourth Estate 
principle, which gives them the right to publish 
whatever they want. This journalistic genre is 
not driven by political ideals or a concern with 
policy issues, but by a search for sensational and 
personal stories. Confl ict between journalists 
and politicians occurs when ‘yellow’ stories 
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impact on political players. This journalistic 
genre also became associated with corrupt 
journalistic practices in which politicians pay 
the media not to publish negative stories. 
A fourth type is lapdog journalism. In this 
category, journalists collaborate with politicians 
and put aside the watchdog approach. In 
short, they avoid being adversaries. This 
collaboration is not necessarily motivated by 
political partisanship, but is more oft en driven 
by a belief that one’s society faces ‘challenges’ 
serious enough to make adversarial watchdog 
journalism unhelpful while trying to solve the 
problems. A sub-variety of lapdog journalism 
is sunshine journalism, a Third World genre 
emerging from the New World Information 
Order/NWIO (Masmoudi, 1979). During the 
1970s and 1980s NWIO theorists argued that 
the problem facing Third World Government 
was so serious that journalists needed to avoid 
’negative’ stories which might destabilize 
them, and instead actively collaborate with 
their government in producing ‘development 
journalism’.  Development journalism 
deliberately focused on positive news, and 
stories that promoted modernist development. 
Much development journalism mutated 
into propaganda, while sunshine journalism 
allowed corruption and maladministration to 
fl ourish (Masmoudi, 1979).
The fi ft h, is a variety of watchdog journalism 
characterized by adversarial watchdogs. This is 
the belief that journalists, in order to function 
as effective watchdogs, must be deliberately 
adversarial towards politicians. Although related 
to the Fourth Estate approach, adversarial 
watchdog journalism has less of a policy focus, 
but more of personality. Since personality and 
character, are easier to sell to mass audiences, 
adversarial watchdog journalists tend to focus 
more on political personalities. The quality of 
socio-political debate or policy making does not 
necessarily improve with such watchdogism. 
Unfortunately, the outcome of this journalist 
category is mainly controversy and confl ict.
The sixth type, junkyard journalism, 
marries aspects of muckraking to adversarial 
watchdogism. This genre of att ack journalism 
produces political reporting that is oft en harsh, 
aggressive, and intrusive, where feeding 
frenzies fl ourish, and gossip reaches print. Every 
aspect of private life potentially becomes fair 
games for scrutiny as a new; almost “anything 
goes” philosophy takes hold (Sabato, 1991: 26). 
Junkyard journalism is even less helpful than 
adversarial watchdogism for promoting the 
exploration, discussion and debate of policy 
issues. This form of journalism is especially 
well suited to the needs of commercial media 
chasing mass audiences because it is a highly 
sensationalist genre lending itself to voyeuristic 
stories about confl ict, pain and sex associated 
with the lurid and titillating events in the lives 
of the rich and famous. 
This chapter explores various ideas 
connected to the notion of the political economy 
of media with the premise that media content 
is produced by a range of complex interactions 
among various political and economic factors. 
The political economy of the media suggests 
that politics and economics are not separate 
substances. Economics and politics are fi elds 
which are best comprehended as being entangled 
– implying that they are practically inseparable 
– and that understanding components of this 
entanglement is urgent to comprehend the way 
that any society and culture works.
Research Methods
Most of the research methods used to 
examine factors aff ecting television contents 
are ‘media-centric’, which means taking, or 
recording the views from within the media. 
The reason for this is because only by knowing 
how the media operate and assess themselves 
can we understand how society infl uences the 
media and vice versa (McQuail, 2000: 123). 
This empirical research examines the 
infl uence politicians have on television program 
content in Indonesia during the period of 
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1998 – 2014. The research focus is established 
based on the research questions: How do 
politicians influence television workers in 
shaping content? The research question needs 
a qualitative descriptive answer from various 
sources, including interview transcripts, notes 
made conducting fi eld observations, various 
documents, media and television reports. 
Television workers would be the center of 
att ention of this research (subject of study), and 
answers to the above research question would 
depend on their opinions, comments, and 
responses, which have been collected through 
intensive interviewing. The interviews with 100 
television workers and other data sources are 
expected to reveal a number of cases, which 
illustrate how advertisers directly or indirectly 
infl uence television content.
This research focuses on the ten 
largest Jakarta-based free-to-air national 
television stations in Indonesia whose content 
compositions are not exactly similar.  The ten 
stations are Indosiar, SCTV, RCTI, MNCV TV, 
Global TV, Metro TV, ANTV, TVOne, Trans TV 
and Trans 7.
Research Findings 
This research is about the relationship 
between politicians and television, and it will 
look at how television contents were infl uenced 
by politicians since the advent of broadcasting 
liberalization in the post-authoritarian era. This 
study pays most of its att ention to the time of 
the election, either legislative or presidential. 
This research shows how politicians played 
their role in utilizing media, and how media in 
turn used politicians to their advantage during 
the post authoritarian era.
The following descriptions are highlights 
of politicians and television relationship at the 
time when four elections were held during the 
post-authoritarian era in Indonesia in 1999, 
2004, 2009 and 2014.
Politicians Influences in the 1999 
Election
Since the downfall of Indonesia’s last 
authoritarian ruler in May 1998, his successor 
President B.J. Habibie, held an election on the 7th 
of June 1999, the fi rst general election aft er the 
fall of the Suharto regime. The election was held 
to select the new member of parliaments with 
some 48 political parties participating. Under 
the former constitution, it was the parliament 
that elected a president. Abdurrahman Wahid, 
from the National Awakening Party, the 
fourth largest party in parliament, was elected 
president while Megawati Sukarnoputri, 
whose party the Indonesian Democratic Party-
Struggle reaped the largest vote, became Vice-
President.
The Golkar Party, the former ruling 
party under Suharto’s New Order regime 
(1966-1998) and the brief presidency of B. J. 
Habibie (1998-1999) came second in the 1999 
election, despite alleged support from several 
television stations. During the New Order 
era, Golkar backed previous government of 
President Suharto, winning greater votes in six 
consecutive election races. On the other hand, 
in 1999, Golkar was censured because the party 
was considered one of the main proponents of 
the authoritarian regime.
Television coverage during the 1999 
election was considered unfair and partial 
since the reporting only favored the Golkar 
Party. Throughout these early reform days most 
television stations continued to support Golkar. 
Private televisions that were broadcasting in 
1999 were considered impartial while state 
television TVRI acted very obviously as a pro 
- Golkar channel (Tomsa, 2008: 34). 
A research on television coverage during 
the 1999 election conducted by a non-profi t 
non-governmental organization The Institute 
for the Studies on Free Flow of Information 
(ISAI) described its findings on television 
reportage during the 1999 election with the 
following remarks (Saptono, 2005: 4). 
212
Jurnal Ilmu Sosial dan Ilmu Politik, Volume 20, Issue 3, March 2017
“Monitoring showed television 
coverage gave much advantage to 
the Golkar party. The activities of 
Golkar received the largest coverage 
compared to other parties. Sources 
from the Golkar party or from those 
who were sympathetic with it were 
quoted in much larger proportion 
compared to those who were critical 
of it. On contrary to the lingering 
public opinion, television displayed 
Golkar party with the image of being 
tolerant, peaceful, reformist and 
anti-status quo”.
The unfair coverage of the 1999 election 
broadcasted by several television stations 
was almost unsurprising since they were still 
under the infl uence of Suharto’s companions, 
and most of them still maintained direct or 
indirect links to key politicians in Golkar. 
Even though the Suharto regime had been 
ousted in 1998, the uncertainty about the future 
of Indonesia’s transition obviously pushed 
television owners to remain loyal to Golkar 
politicians whose party they had backed up for 
so many years. Two private televisions, ANTV 
and Indosiar, for example, belonged to Bakrie 
Group and Salim Group respectively. These 
two business empires had very close links to 
the Suharto clan and politicians in Golkar. 
Another big television, SCTV, was controlled 
by Suharto’s cousin Sudwikatmono who was 
a major shareholder. TPI was owned by Siti 
Hardiyanti Indra Rukmana (popularly known 
as mbak Tutut), Suharto’s oldest daughter 
and former Golkar Chairperson. Last but not 
least, a company owned by Suharto’s son and 
former Golkar dignitary Bambang Trihatmodjo 
controlled RCTI, the oldest private television in 
Indonesia (Tomsa, 2008).
For most television executives, who 
prospered under the New Order regime, 
Golkar was still regarded as bett er suited to 
defend their interest. For example, former 
RCTI’s deputy chief editor, Desi Anwar, said 
the news division couldn’t be completely 
autonomous, particularly in the New Order 
era. “We could not be 100 percent independent. 
We should consider who owns the station... 
who owns the shares,” Desi said, referring to 
the relatives of former president Suharto (The 
Jakarta Post, 1999).
Politicians Influences in the 2004 
Election
Direct election of the President and 
Vice President became imminent in Indonesia 
following the amendments of the constitution, 
and the influence of politicians reached its 
unprecedented level in 2004 when the country’s 
fi rst-ever direct presidential election was held 
in the post-authoritarian era. A signifi cant part 
of the election race occurred in television media, 
in party messages and advertisements as well 
as talk shows and entertainment programs 
(Lindsay, 2005: 43). 
During the campaign period, politics 
and popular culture blended more perfectly 
than ever before wherein the role of television 
was central to this process. The blend between 
popular culture and politics and the appearance 
of politicians had never been as intense as it 
was in the period of presidential campaigns 
when Indonesian people for the fi rst time had 
a chance to directly elect their new leaders.  
In the July 2004 presidential campaign, 
there were fi ve top politician couples  running 
in the first round of presidential elections: 
Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono and Jusuf Kalla; 
Megawati and Hasyim Muzadi; Amien Rais 
and Siswono Yudo Husodo; Wiranto and 
Salahuddin Wahid and; Hamzah Haz and 
Agum Gumelar. 
In 2004, there were 24 political parties, 
which competed with each other for voters’ 
att ention, allowing televisions to enjoy more 
revenues from political advertisements. For 
example, the presidential candidate Megawati, 
who was incumbent at that time and her 
political party, The Indonesian Democratic 
Party of Struggle (PDI-P), had reportedly spent 
around 50 billion rupiah (US$5.5 million) for 
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television political advertisements (Sumarkidjo, 
2011 : 67). Commenting on political party’s 
expenditure during the 2004 campaigns, 
former RCTI’s Deputy Chief Editor Atmadji 
Sumarkidjo (personal communication, August, 
20, 2013) said:
“Ahead of the presidential election 
in 2004, television stations were 
enjoying a lot more advertisements 
from the competing presidential 
and vice presidential candidates. 
Television stations were vying to 
hold exclusive talk shows with the 
presidential and vice presidential 
candidates”. 
Politicians devised a strategy for launching 
their campaign programs on television. They 
didn’t rely merely on the 30-second spot 
advertisements to promote themselves and 
their political parties; politicians wanted more 
exposure to televisions by buying special 
time, known as “blocking time” for their 
campaigns. In the blocking time contract -much 
more expensive than regular advertisement- 
television helps politicians, on their request, to 
create their own program, for example special 
talk shows or others, or use existing television 
programs to be dedicated for campaigning of 
politicians who paid for their appearance in 
the program. 
On the whole, the television coverage 
during the 2004 election was considered 
fair and impartial, both for the General and 
Presidential Elections. Contrary to the 1999 
election, politicians’ campaign activities of 
all political parties were covered in most of 
the televisions. According to the European 
Union Election Observation Mission (EU EOM) 
which was invited by the Indonesian Electoral 
Commission (KPU) to observe the 2004 Election 
in Indonesia, the tone dedicated to political 
parties and news distribution throughout the 
election was fair, reasonable and nonpartisan. 
Sissener (2004 : 22) who wrote a report on behalf 
of EU EOM said 
“For the General Election, the 
EU EOM assessed that the media 
coverage of the political parties 
during the election was fair and 
impartial. All 24 parties were 
covered in most of the electronic and 
print media monitored by the EU 
EOM. The tone devoted to political 
parties and distribution of news 
was fair and neutral. All in all, the 
contending candidates were seen as 
being provided with opportunities 
to share their vision, mission and 
working programs with the public” 
(Sissener, 2004: 22)
According to EU EOM, only Metro TV 
performed the worst. The station received a 
warning from the Broadcasting Commission for 
presenting too much advertisement in support 
of Megawati (PDI-P) and Surya Paloh, Golkar’s 
top politician and owner of Metro TV. 
Megawati led television coverage because 
politicians and sympathizers who were capable 
of buying more advertising time backed her up. 
Broadcasters at Metro TV showed a reasonable 
inclination towards President Megawati in their 
news program. However, this bias considered 
to have restricted eff ect on the voters due to 
the program’s lower ratings. With everything 
considered, all contending candidates were 
seen as being furnished with equivalent 
chances to share their vision, mission and 
working programs (Sissener, 2004: 37).
Meanwhile, the European Parliament 
(2004) authorized a delegation composed of fi ve 
members to observe the second round of the 
presidential election to be held in Indonesia on 
20 September 2004. According to the European 
Parliament, by and large the media assumed 
a positive role in spreading data about the 
candidates and all their electoral activities, 
and by highlighting conceivable campaign 
infringements. Private televisions, specifi cally 
SCTV and RCTI, gave more impartial access 
to the two competitors than the state channel, 
especially in news. In the weeks running 
up to the election races, Metro TV started 
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to demonstrate a predisposition for SBY, in 
contrast to the past round, when it favored 
Megawati (European Parliament, 2004 : 9-10).
A report by the Institute for the Studies 
on Free Flow of Information (ISAI) that 
examined television news coverage during the 
2004 election campaign revealed televisions’ 
better performance in three genres: news 
feature, talk-show, and news bulletin (Saptono, 
2005: 437). ISAI said televisions were no longer 
megaphones or partisans of certain groups 
or political parties during the 2004 election 
especially with regard to a feature story, or a 
television news package containing in-depth 
journalistic report that covers a selected issue. 
According to the media research organization, 
the television feature stories were no longer 
focusing on one political party or one pair of 
presidential or vice presidential candidates as 
the television did during the 1999 election.  
Despite being stigmatized as the 
spoilt rulers’ party after over 30 years of 
relationship with the then ruling New Order 
government, the Golkar Party hit back to win 
the 2004 general election. The outcomes of the 
legislative election indicated that the former 
president Soeharto’s Golkar Party returned to 
power in the parliament with 128 of 550 seats. 
The triumph was an inversion of fortune 
for Golkar, which lost to the Indonesian 
Democratic Party of Struggle (PDI-P) in the 
1999 elections, the fi rst time it had been out 
of power since 1970.
Politicians Influences in the 2009 
Election
The 2009 elect ion campaign was 
characterized by entertainment more 
than political education and propaganda. 
Entertainment was the main engine for 
politicians to grab people’s att ention. Traditional 
and modern genres of performance were 
deployed through various media, from a 
musical stage performance in kampongs to the 
fanfare of political entertainment on national 
televisions. Those performances were held by 
politicians to gather the masses, to a greater 
extent than previous elections. Of all the 
entertainment formats derived from television 
programs, Indonesian Idol was the one that 
appealed most to campaigners in the 2009 
elections (Heryanto, 2010: 327). 
However, despite the extravaganza 
of political entertainments on the television 
screen, the election campaigns were considered 
successful and television displayed their fair 
role to all contestants. Without precedent 
for Indonesia’s post-authoritarian time, the 
country had the opportunity to unbiasedly 
rate the competence and capacities of the 
presidential candidates in a series of debates 
held in mid-June 2009. Unlike the 2004 election 
when televisions vied with each other to hold 
exclusive interviews with each individual 
presidential candidate; in the 2009 election, 
television networks worked together to 
broadcast the head-to-head presidential 
debates live throughout the country. 
Coordinated by the General Elections 
Commission (KPU), five private television 
stations owned by fi ve media moguls worked 
together to organize the debates featuring all 
three presidential candidates – Jusuf Kalla of 
the Golkar Party, Megawati Soekarnoputri of 
the Indonesian Democratic Party of Struggle 
(PDI-P), and incumbent President Susilo 
Bambang Yudhoyono of the Democratic Party 
(PD). There were a total of fi ve debates, three 
for presidential candidates and two for vice 
presidential candidates. Trans TV kicked off  
the premier televised debate at its studio, which 
was also broadcasted on four other television 
stations: Metro TV, RCTI, SCTV, TV One. 
Television watchdog, the National 
Broadcasting Commission (KPI), appreciated 
the cooperation shown by the five private 
television networks in promoting the 2009 
election especially the successful presidential 
and vice presidential debates. KPI said the 
private stations had displayed their commitment 
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to work together to broadcast the events in a 
bid to provide proper political education to the 
public. KPI (2009) said in a statement:
“KPI also judged that television 
had become an institution with the 
biggest role and influence in the 
socialization process and opinions 
during the presidential campaigns. 
The role was implemented in 
various television programs starting 
from news programs, talk-shows 
and others. Television played its 
enormous role in the democratization 
process in Indonesia by transferring 
conflict from the grass root level 
to conflicts in media which is 
considered healthier”.
Media analysts considered most television 
stations had conducted a relatively fair coverage 
during the 2009 election campaigns for both the 
legislative and presidential election. They said 
televisions were able to keep their distance from 
infl uences of politicians and the presidential 
candidates. Atmadji Sumarkidjo said he 
didn’t see televisions, through the reportage 
they made, blatantly expressing support or 
sympathy, to a certain candidate during the 
2009 election. However, he observed that 
the incumbent presidential candidate, Susilo 
Bambang Yudhoyono (SBY), had infl uence on 
most television owners. Nevertheless, they 
managed not to intervene in stations’ news 
policy, allowing people in the news department 
to do their job quite independently (personal 
communication, August 20, 2013).  
Atmadji Sumarkidjo added that the 
incumbent candidate had influence on 
television owners because of his prospect 
for being reelected in the 2009 election given 
good performance of his past government. 
Sumarkidjo said: “Most television owners 
supported SBY, not through editorial policy, but 
through any other means like fund contributions 
or helping campaigns ceremonies” (personal 
communication, August, 20 2013).  
Television workers at two television 
stations owned by Chairul Tanjung, Trans 
TV and Trans 7, said the owner supported 
the incumbent candidate Susilo Bambang 
Yudhoyono (abbreviated as SBY) and his 
running mate Boediono before and during the 
2009 presidential election. They said Chairul 
Tandjung showed his support to SBY-Boediono 
by providing popular artists when the couple 
addressed an election rally at Senayan stadium. 
Tandjung also broadcast the rally live through 
his two television channels. However, apart 
from this type of support, Tandjung didn’t 
impose his will on journalists at his two 
televisions. He didn’t demand the journalists 
to also support SBY-Boediono.
Atmadji Sumarkidjo said television 
coverage on the 2009 election was considered 
as relatively fair and neutral. The fairness and 
neutrality of television reportage could be 
seen from the lack of protests from the losing 
contestants with regard to media fairness in 
covering the election campaigns. The losing 
contestants never accused television stations 
to have taken side with SBY-Boediono hence 
allowing them to win the election. 
In whole, voters in Indonesia obtained 
an ample opportunity to access non-biased 
information thanks to the country’s highly 
dynamic media landscape with almost a 
dozen national television channels covering 
the election, reporting on both the government 
and opposition parties. However, despite the 
general fairness and neutrality shown by 
most televisions during the 2009 election, 
Metro TV was an exception. The station was 
criticized for broadcasting too much coverage 
of its owner, Surya Paloh, and the Golkar 
Party, of which he was still the advisory board 
chairman. The infl uence of Surya Paloh and 
other politicians of the Golkar party on his 
television channel, Metro TV, was clearly 
undeniable.
During the 2009 election, Metro TV along 
with TV One reserved most programming time 
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for the elections, branding themselves as the 
2009 election channel. Concerns loomed about 
the independence of the two television stations 
since both were owned by top members of the 
Golkar party; TV One owned by the Bakrie 
family and Metro TV by Surya Paloh. However 
the two politicans, who were also media 
owners, were known to be bitt er rivals who had 
vied with each other for the Golkar leadership 
(Aspinall & Mietzner, 2010). Elman Saragih, 
Metro TV’s editor-in-chief, said that his will 
to maintain independence from the infl uence 
of politicians and owner-cum-politicians was 
always alive and well, but in reality, that was 
not always the case. “We keep trying to reduce 
the interference [from Surya Paloh] though 
it is not always that easy,” Elman said in his 
defense (The Jakarta Globe, 2009). He said in 
reality, there was almost no media organization 
that was free of special interests. However, he 
added, Metro TV did maintain impartiality 
toward other political fi gures. 
Politicians Influences in the 2014 
Elections
In the era of post-authoritarian Indonesia, 
the 2014 election is likely to be remembered as 
the fi ercest and most confrontational campaign. 
The reason is because three media moguls 
who control 10 national television channels in 
Indonesia joined political parties. They were 
elected as chairman or senior member of three 
diff erent political parties. Aburizal Bakrie was 
elected as Golkar Party’s chairman in October 
2009; Surya Paloh was elected as chairman 
of Nasdem Party in January 2013; and, Hary 
Tanoesoedibjo joined the People’s Conscience 
Party (Hanura) in February 2013. The role of 
these television owners cum politicians made 
the 2014 election a fanfare and bewilderment. 
Following the legislative election, two 
names emerged as the strongest candidates 
for the presidency: Prabowo Subianto, chief of 
Gerindra Party and Joko Widodo from PDI-P. 
Prabowo Subianto was a former Lieutenant 
General in the Indonesian National Armed 
Forces. He was the former Army’s Special 
Forces (Kopassus) commander who was fi red 
from his position due to his complicity in the 
kidnapping of pro-democracy activists in 1998. 
He became a businessman aft erward, and ran 
for the vice-presidency in the 2009 election 
accompanying Megawati Sukarnoputri, 
chairperson of PDI-P, who ran for president. 
Joko Widodo, or better known by the 
abbreviated name Jokowi, is a politician from 
PDI-P. Jokowi and his running mate Jusuf Kalla 
managed to garner more parties that support 
him including National Democrat (NasDem) 
and the National Awakening Party (PKB) as 
well as the People’s Conscience Party. 
Prabowo and his running mate Hatta 
Radjasa were backed by six parties, including 
the Golkar Party led by Aburizal Bakrie whose 
family controlled two television stations. 
Radjasa was a prominent minister and chairman 
of the National Mandate Party (PAN). Prabowo 
was also backed by media tycoon Hary 
Tanoesoedibjo, the president and CEO of Media 
Nusantara Citra (MNC) Group, which controls 
three national television stations and other kind 
of media outlets. 
Following Tanoesoedibjo’s pledge to 
support Prabowo Subianto and Hatt a Rajasa 
in the presidential election, the nation saw 
the beginning of a fierce political battle 
involving media magnates who were also 
politicians. With Tanoesoedibjo’s support, 
Prabowo received a significant campaign 
boost. Tanoesoedibjo had the biggest share 
of the free-to-air market with three television 
stations: RCTI, MNCTV and Global TV. The 
group also had three pay television networks. 
Aside from that, Hary controlled a handful of 
radio stations and Koran Sindo newspaper. 
Apart from Tanoesoedibjo’s media outlets, 
Prabowo benefi tt ed from his coalition with 
the Golkar Party, whose chairman Aburizal 
Bakrie and his family owned PT Visi Media 
Asia (VIVA), which managed two television 
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stations — ANTV and TVOne — as well as 
online portal Viva news.  
Jokowi, on the other hand, received 
media support from NasDem’s Surya Paloh 
who owns news television channel Metro TV 
and Media Indonesia daily. However, Paloh’s 
Metro TV only had 3 percent of the country’s 
viewership, compared to 44 percent for the 
fi ve stations that were pro-Prabowo (Nangoy 
& Fabi, 2014). In terms of television stations, 
Prabowo’s camp had much more power than 
Jokowi’s.
In the 2014 election, the use of media by 
politicians for political campaigns was much 
more intense compared to the other previous 
elections and the partisanship was much more 
obvious as television owners were directly 
involved. Media moguls cum politicians, 
with their vibrant soul and powerful fi nancial 
backup, vied with each other for political 
power and the media eventually were blamed 
for running biased coverage of both legislative 
and especially presidential race. Television 
campaign coverage was a reflection of the 
political preferences of station owners. Some 
television station owners had sided with the 
Jokowi-Jusuf Kalla pairing, while others chose 
the Prabowo Subianto-Hatt a Rajasa team. 
Politicians who controlled several 
television stations gave excessive coverage 
and advertising spots to their respective 
affi  liated parties. Television channels belonging 
to Tanoesudibyo, Paloh, and Bakrie showed 
special att ention to their political parties in 
the lead up to the legislative and presidential 
election. For example, TV One and MNC 
Group had dedicated a higher percentage of 
presidential election coverage to Prabowo-
Hatt a’s campaign, while Metro TV had given 
more airtime to Jokowi-Kalla. TV One devoted 
a large portion of its news programs to the 
campaigns of Prabowo. There was no such 
scope for Jokowi on TV One.  On the same day, 
Paloh’s Metro TV broadcasted a live report of 
Jokowi’s speech at diff erent campaign locations, 
while Bakrie’s TVOne refused to air those 
events. Some stations use various programs, 
including soap operas, quizzes, reality-shows, 
and even religious content for campaigns and 
political ads. 2
In the Election Day on July 9, 2014 
television stations broadcasted the results of 
quick count surveys of the vote from at least a 
dozen polling companies which took samples 
from selected polling stations. Some fi ve pro 
Prabowo television channels broadcasted live 
polling results only from polling agencies that 
predicted he would win the election, while 
Metro TV only broadcasted results from 
agencies that aff orded victory to Jokowi. 
Tensions fl ared aft er television stations 
showed different polling results that led 
to victory claims from both contenders. 
Jokowi announced his victory aft er results of 
progressing quick counts broadcasted on Metro 
TV showed his leading position with 52 percent 
of the vote against Subianto. Other television 
channels whose owners did not show any 
blatant political disposition, including SCTV, 
Indosiar and Trans Corp (Trans TV and Trans 
7) also showed Jokowi’s leading position in 
their quick count programs. Later, Prabowo 
also claimed victory aft er quick counts from 
four polling agencies showed him leading with 
52% of the vote. 
Television workers interviewed during 
this research said politicians imposed great 
influence on their work. They were asked, 
forced and even intimidated by their superiors 
to run unbalanced stories during the legislative 
and presidential campaign. In interviews held 
for this research, several television workers 
2 Based on KPI monitoring that lasted from May 19-25, 
2014 Prabowo-Hatt a coverage at Metro TV was aired 
only on 110 occasions during the period, lower than 
Jokowi-Kalla’s fi gure of 187. Conversely, at TV One, the 
Jokowi-Kalla campaign garnered a mere 79 coverage 
while there were 153 examples of Prabowo-Hatta 
campaign coverage. At RCTI, the gap was even greater, 
with Prabowo-Hatt a appearing 30 times compared to 
seven times for Jokowi-Kalla.
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said political affi  liated station owners through 
their superiors demanded reporters to run 
stories that supported one of the presidential 
candidates. Television reporters who work at 
several stations in support of Prabowo and 
Radjasa said they must support the pairing 
by running favorable stories about them. 
Television workers at TV One and ANTV said 
they were threatened with losing their jobs 
by the station management if they dared to 
broadcast content about Jokowi. 
In the 2014 election, it was obvious that 
television stations were predisposed to certain 
presidential candidate due to political affi  liation 
of the media owners. Tremendous amount of 
news were diverted by media owners’ political 
preferences even at those television outlets 
that do not belong to politicians although 
they didn’t show a vulgar partisan att itude. 
Television worker at SCTV, whose owners 
were not affiliated to any political parties, 
said the station was consciously partial and it 
built information with the objective to aff ect 
viewers to vote for a certain candidate that 
the station’s owners supported in the form of 
continuous news broadcasting of the preferred 
candidate. 
The 2014 election could be seen as one 
of the most marked event in the history of 
Indonesian media. During the campaign, it 
was not easy for television viewers to find 
objective information, especially political 
news that could be accounted for. Those who 
used infl uence as owners of media networks 
assumed that media content showing their 
faces would turn into votes in the election. They 
hoped that the more content they produced, 
the more public sympathy and infl uence they 
would get.  But their expectations were not the 
equivalent to the reality. Politicians and their 
political parties that had wide support from 
the media were not automatically successful in 
acquiring substantial amount of votes. Prabowo 
who gained the largest obvious support from 
the affi  liated fi ve national television stations 
eventually suff ered defeat against Jokowi who 
was backed up by lesser media supports. 
Conclusion
Politicians played an important role in 
shaping the content of television programs, and 
the relationship between politicians and the 
media intensifi ed during political campaigns. 
The politicians could be elites of political parties 
who have close relationships with media 
owners, rich politicians and sympathizers 
who can afford to buy television blocking 
time, and ultimately politicians who are also 
media owners. Of the four elections held in 
the post-authoritarian era, politicians played 
a highly signifi cant role in shaping politically 
related program content especially the news. 
Most television networks had conducted a 
relatively fair coverage of the 2004 and 2009 
election, but were unfair and partisan in the 
1999 and 2014 elections. Indonesian political 
life faced new development in 2014 as media 
moguls jumped into the political arena and 
vied with each other for political power. The 
result is the fi ercest and most confrontational 
campaign Indonesian people ever remembered 
due partly to the role of television. Television 
was blamed for running biased coverage of 
both legislative and especially presidential race. 
Television coverage of political campaigns had 
a tendency to be biased, which most likely is 
a manifestation of the political inclinations of 
the station proprietors.
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